FIELD MANUAL No. HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY Section V – AirLand Battle and Counterguerrilla Operations. Donor challenge: Your generous donation will be matched 2-to-1 right now. Your $5 becomes $15! Dear Internet Archive Supporter,. I ask only. Counterguerilla Operations FM MCRP a [Department of Defense, Taylor Anderson] on *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers. The

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A cold climate usually favors the counterguerrilla force and hampers guerrilla operations since it increases the logistics required to support the guerrilla.

opreations They are also used to minimize damage to a target if it is attacked. The terrain consideration also includes consideration of weather. The counterguerrilla force commander must realize that destruction of numerous insignificant targets may cause more damage and confusion than the destruction or damage of one important target.

The counterguerrilla force commander may or may not have control over all forces in the rear area for employment in rear battle operations. If the guerrilla’s only source of resupply is external, then interdiction of his supply lines can decrease or halt operations counterguerrila the guerrilla’s supplies are exhausted.

FM – Field Manuals – FM Counter-guerrilla Operations | Survival Monkey Forums

Usually, guerrillas operating in a rear area then acquire logistical support from external sources, from captured equipment and supplies, and from the civilian populace. A strong economic climate usually does not favor either force. What may be the least likely course of action for a conventional force may be the most likely for the guerrilla force. In most cases, however, the military objective of destroying the guerrilla force takes precedence over other considerations as long as operations are planned to minimize damage to civilian property.

An understanding of the goals of a guerrilla force operating in rear areas and a general analysis of the environment of the area of operations provide a framework for planning.


These may include specific limitations regarding the use of firepower and types of weapons, or they may be general regarding the relationship of the counterguerrilla force with the civilian population. When considering the environment that the participants will be involved in, the commander’s plans for counterguerrilla operations must consider terrain and climate, as well as political, sociological, economic, and psychological factors. The counterguerrilla force commander must be aware that the guerrilla force may have NBC weapons available to it.


This is the most recent available version of the U. Population support for the goals of the enemy force usually favors the guerrilla.

In all instances, it is imperative that the principle of unity of command be maintained to minimize confusion and indecision that will occur if there is an inability to determine who is in command.

The guerrilla force seeks to disrupt command, control, communications, and logistics operations and facilities.

FM 90-8 Counterguerilla Operations

In addition, opdrations counterguerrilla force maximizes all opedations that can be gained from tactical operations to locate the guerrilla force. There can be no revolution without a resistance movement, but there can be a resistance movement without a revolution when the objectives of the resistors do not envision a reallocation of power.

By destroying key facilities and interdicting lines of communication and supply, the guerrilla force causes confusion within the friendly force rear areas. They are characterized by elusiveness, surprise, and brief, violent action.


There must be a leadership element that can direct the frustrations of a dissatisfied populace along the coounterguerrilla delineated by the overall insurgent strategy.

A population that actively supports the counterguerrilla force greatly enhances the capability to detect guerrilla forces. Some of these factors include the force composition, counterguerril,a assets, fire support assets, mobility, equipment, and size of the counterguerrilla force. The nature of the threat and tactics suitable to counter the threat are discussed.

An insurgency implies a situation where a country is threatened by an internal attempt, frequently assisted by external support, to overthrow the legitimate government. Special units trained for guerrilla warfare usually have a primary mission to conduct guerrilla warfare operations against targets of opportunity with a follow-on mission to train an indigenous guerrilla force.

The guerrilla force also serves to cause commitment of friendly forces, best used in the close battle, to the rear battle. Offensive and defensive techniques are discussed in Chapter 3. Generally, these techniques can be classified as either offensive or defensive.

This manual provides commanders and staffs of brigade elements and below with concepts and doctrine concerning the conduct of counterguerrilla operations by US forces in insurgency and conventional conflict environments. As with political factors, social factors are considered, but their impact is usually reduced.

In this analysis, the commander and his staff determine all specified and implied tasks:. An analysis of the factors of METT-T will provide the specific information and indications to complete operational plans. Generally, the relationship between the counterguerrilla force and the civilian population is governed by restrictions and agreements that the US has with the government s of the country or countries in which the conflict takes place.


Because of the capability of NBC weapons to cause a maximum amount of confusion with a limited amount of personnel, their use must be considered as a method that the guerrilla may employ.

The guerrilla force remains a source of harassment as long as it operates in the rear area. Each geographic area is analyzed to determine the effects of climate since no two areas have identical climates.

Preventive defensive techniques include movement security, security patrolling, and combat patrolling, among others. In all cases where conventional enemy forces are using guerrilla warfare tactics, the counterguerrilla force commander must expect their degree of training, equipment, and sophistication to match that found in the main enemy force. Usually, the indigenous guerrilla force must rely on external support for its logistics requirements.

In applying these principles, the commander must be aware that the situation in each counterguerrilla operation is unique. The weather is analyzed to determine its effect on both the guerrilla and the counterguernlla force. Since the guerrilla force may have the capability to use NBC, the effect of weather on NBC and smoke is also addressed. Unconventional warface forces that may conduct guerrilla warfare consist of special units trained specifically for guerrilla warfare and indigenous guerrilla forces sponsored by the main enemy force.

The guerrilla force may possess weapons, communications, and technology equal to or superior to the rear battle forces. Rather, the guerrilla force relies more on its ability to cause confusion in rear areas. If the command and support relationships are not clearly delineated in the initial order, countefguerrilla the commander must ensure that he receives that guidance prior to commencement of operations.

Generally, a mild climate favors the guerrilla force vm it induces less physical hardship, and may provide year-round vegetation for subsistence, cover, and concealment. Only if this force uses guerrilla warfare tactics is it considered a guerrilla force.